Alternative salary auction mechanisms for the Navy an experimental program by Resare, Nils A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2007-12
Alternative salary auction mechanisms
for the Navy an experimental program
Resare, Nils A.













ALTERNATIVE SALARY AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   William Gates 
  Peter Coughlan 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2007 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Alternative Salary Auction Mechanisms for the Navy: 
An Experimental Program 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Resare, Nils A. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Navy Personnel Command 
5720 Integrity Drive, Millington TN 38055 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
An experimental program was developed to test the impact of bidding behavior on two matching 
mechanisms proposed by prior research for use in the U.S. Navy’s Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) program. AIP is 
one compensation program used by the Navy to encourage sailors to volunteer for less desirable assignments. Unlike 
other compensation programs, sailors negotiate AIP rates through an auction-like system. Previous research has 
proposed new mechanisms to effectively match sailors to assignments based on the sailors’ bids and Navy valuations. 
However, the two mechanisms provide different incentives for sailors to truthfully reveal their minimum acceptable 
AIP through their bids. The experimental program has been developed to help determine which matching mechanism 
gives better incentives for sailors to bid closer to their true valuations and how bidding differently than these 
valuations impacts the effectiveness and cost of the matching mechanisms. The proper operation of the experimental 
program was verified through 60 simulated sessions of ten participants bidding their true values. The program was 
further tested on a trial run with 20 volunteer subjects completing 20 bidding rounds each. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
89 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Enlisted assignment, incentive pay, auction experiment, compensation, AIP 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
ALTERNATIVE SALARY AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR THE NAVY: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM 
 
Nils A Resare 
Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1986 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Robert N. Beck 
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
An experimental program was developed to test the impact of bidding behavior on 
two matching mechanisms proposed by prior research for use in the U.S. Navy’s 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) program. AIP is one compensation program used by the 
Navy to encourage sailors to volunteer for less desirable assignments. Unlike other 
compensation programs, sailors negotiate AIP rates through an auction-like system. 
Previous research has proposed new mechanisms to effectively match sailors to 
assignments based on the sailors’ bids and Navy valuations. However, the two 
mechanisms provide different incentives for sailors to truthfully reveal their minimum 
acceptable AIP through their bids. The experimental program has been developed to help 
determine which matching mechanism gives better incentives for sailors to bid closer to 
their true valuations and how bidding differently than these valuations impacts the 
effectiveness and cost of the matching mechanisms. The proper operation of the 
experimental program was verified through 60 simulated sessions of ten participants 
bidding their true values. The program was further tested on a trial run with 20 volunteer 
subjects completing 20 bidding rounds each. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
The Navy introduced Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) as a cost-effective means 
to entice sailors to volunteer for difficult to fill billets. AIP is a relatively small program, 
accounting for $26 million of the approximately $900 million the Navy budgeted for 
special pays to enlisted personnel.  AIP is an auction type system where sailors bid a 
monthly incentive pay amount that they would be willing to accept to volunteer for an 
assignment.  
Traditionally, efficient incentives for these hard-to-fill billets are difficult to 
determine. Incentive pay levels have typically been set based on historical data about how 
hard a billet is to fill with a volunteer. Pay levels are raised or lowered on an infrequent 
basis. Other non-monetary incentives may also be used (e.g., improved advancement 
chances, improved choice for follow-on assignment). No attempt has been made to assess 
changes in assignment desirability. Therefore, the resulting incentives set for the billets 
may attract too many or too few volunteers for the billets available in any given 
assignment period. 
Auctions are used as a method to determine how much individual bidders value 
an item or service. Auctions may be conducted live or by sealed bid. Due to the nature of 
information in most live auctions, bidders have an incentive to always bid up to their true 
value for the good or service. However, live auctions are impractical when all the bidders 
can not gather (in-person, online, or otherwise) simultaneously during the bidding 
process (e.g., stationed in different assignments, locations, and time-zones around the 
world). Sealed bid auctions allow bidders to make bids when not able to gather for a live 
auction. In a sealed bid second price auction, bidders have the dominant strategy to bid 
their true value for the product or service up for bidding. The bid most advantageous for 




lowest bid where the auctioneer is paying money), but the bidder pays or receives the first 
excluded bid (i.e., the second highest or lowest bid when there is only one item being 
sold or purchased). 
The AIP process involves sailors bidding their minimum acceptable AIP levels 
against available billets. Sailors may bid for multiple billets. The Navy assigns the best 
value sailor, based primarily on AIP bid amount. When assigned through the AIP 
process, sailors receive the monthly incentive pay they bid for the billet for the duration 
of their assignment to that billet. AIP rates can vary for individual billets, based on the 
preferences of the sailors up for assignment, and the implementation of the matching 
system. 
Recent student theses (Homb, 2006; Tan, 2006) have modeled and simulated the 
sailor to billet matching process. They have determined that there are two major 
complications. Since the number of qualified sailors for a billet may be limited, bidders 
may have an incentive to overbid their willingness to accept if they believe they will be 
assigned a billet regardless of their bid.  Additionally, auctions assume only bidders have 
preferences. Sailors may overstate their willingness to accept if additional variables are 
included to reflect the Navy’s preferences (e.g., sailor’s change of station cost, additional 
cost to train sailor). An alternative auction mechanism that combined elements of both 
auction theory and matching was proposed to overcome these complications and 
potentially reduce the cost of AIP to the Navy. 
B. PURPOSE 
This research developed and verified an experimental program to investigate 
bidding strategies in two matching mechanisms in an auction system.  The frequency of 
the auction mechanism successfully finding sailor-to-assignment solutions was compared 
to theoretical results. Observed bid-reservation value differentials were compared to 
theoretical differentials to assess the potential impact of gaming on the use of the 
proposed mechanism. 
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C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
1.  Scope 
This thesis focuses on applying auction and matching theory to incentive schemes 
in the U.S. Navy. It summarizes auctions and matching theory, current compensation 
schemes in DoD, and applicability of experiments. It describes the experiment program 
design in detail, and verifies the proper operation of the program. The effectiveness of the 
algorithms proposed by Homb and Tan (Homb, 2006; Tan, 2006) at matching sailors to 
billets is reviewed. Recommended experimental variations that affect the truth revealing 
nature of the two matching models are proposed. Preliminary observations and 
verification of the user interface from a trial run of the program are presented. 
2. Limitations 
This thesis does not make policy recommendations, nor does it fully explore all 
the factors that drive sailors’ decisions when making bids under the AIP system. The 
participants in the experiment are not directly representative of the Enlisted Navy 
population at large. The impact of ex-post bargaining or intervention by participants in 
the system is not evaluated. Finally, this experiment assumes that participants can 
accurately assign values to billets. 
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This research will provide an experimental tool to help improve knowledge and 
understanding of the application of auction and matching theory to assignments in DoD. 
It will validate previously presented models and simulation. It could be used when 
considering the policies covering AIP in the U.S. Navy, or other similar programs 
throughout the DoD. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Applicable auction and matching theory is presented in Chapter II. Chapter III 
presents applications of auctions for assignment in the military. The experiment program 
setup and validation are covered in Chapter IV. Chapter V will summarize the thesis, 
provide conclusions, and make recommendations for further research.  
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II. AUCTION AND MATCHING THEORY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Economists study the distribution of resources to improve the efficiency of that 
distribution (Bohm, 1973). Unless restrained by prices, the demand for resources (e.g., 
monetary, natural, or labor) is normally greater than the supply of those resources. 
Economic benefits accrue to both suppliers and consumers. Suppliers’ benefits are the 
differences between what it costs suppliers to generate the resources and what they 
receive for those resources. A consumer’s benefit is the difference between the value that 
consumer places on the resource and what he or she pays for that resource. The total 
economic benefit (economic surplus) is the sum of benefits to both supplier and 
consumer, or the difference between what it costs a supplier to generate the resource and 
the value the consumer receives from that resource. An economically efficient 
distribution of resources between suppliers and consumers is one that results in the 
greatest overall economic benefits for the agents involved (but not necessarily an equal or 
otherwise “fair” distribution of benefits between suppliers and consumers).  
Competitive markets maximize economic efficiency even though buyers and 
seller never explicitly reveal their valuations. Competition between buyers and sellers 
ensures that products are supplied by the most efficient producers and sold to the buyers 
with the highest values. Individual agents are motivated to keep values private. Agents 
bargain amongst themselves to set prices for goods. In a market where all goods are the 
same (a commodity market), the overall market value of a good will eventually be 
revealed (consumers will have no incentive to purchase a commodity at a higher price 
when a higher priced commodity brings no additional benefit). Prices are normally 
established over time, through multiple transactions. Consumers continue to buy 
commodities being sold at a lower price than their consumer value. Sellers will continue 
to sell those commodities, lowering prices until they no longer can recoup the cost of 
producing the goods.  
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True commodity markets are limited. In some cases very few items are available 
and there is great demand for these items (e.g., individual works of art or rights to extract 
resources from a designated area). In some case, by signaling a higher or lower value 
than his or her true value, an agent may be able to gain a higher surplus but, in doing so, 
may also change the distribution of resources possibly resulting in a less efficient 
outcome. 
In a thin market, where limited buyers or sellers preclude a competitive market 
outcome, consumers and producers must reveal their true valuations in some other way to 
ensure economic efficiency. Without this truthful revelation, there is no guarantee that a 
given distribution could not be changed to improve the overall economic surplus. 
Auctions provide a mechanism to allocate goods in these thin markets, where there is 
typically either a single seller and many buyers or a single buyer and many sellers 
(preventing price determination through multiple buying and selling interactions of the 
same good). In auctions, sellers make goods available (often at a minimum, or 
reservation, price) and consumers express their willingness to buy goods at prices set by 
various mechanisms. If buyers and sellers accurately signal their values, an economically 
efficient distribution of goods will occur.  
Different auction mechanisms have evolved over time, and each presents different 
incentives for accurate signaling of valuations. Auctions are recorded in ancient times, 
and have been used extensively to transact valuable works of art, rare wines, and even 
recently, the rights to use of portions of the radio spectrum (Milgrom, 1998).  
B. KEY TERMINOLOGY 
1. Common Value versus Independent Private-Values 
An auction where an object has the same value to all the bidders is a common 
value auction. An example of a common value auction would be an auction for a jar of 
pennies. No matter who wins the jar, the jar contains the same monetary value. In the 
case of common value auctions, knowing another bidder’s valuation may cause bidders to 
revise their value estimates. In the example of the jar of pennies, bidders estimate the 
amount of pennies that could be contained in the volume. Since the number of pennies in 
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a given volume can not change, errors in estimates will only arise from differing 
estimates of the actual volume. Each bidder will have a different estimate of the jar’s 
value. Assuming buyers bid symmetrically according to their individual estimates of the 
value of the penny jar (for example, everybody bids exactly their estimate of the value or 
everybody bids 90% of their estimate), the bidder with the highest estimated value will 
ultimately win the auction. The true value of the jar most likely lies somewhere near the 
middle of the range of estimates, so the highest estimated value for the jar will almost 
always be higher than the jar’s actual value. Thus, any winning bidder in a common value 
auction (who did not bid significantly below his or her estimate of the value of the object) 
will probably have overpaid for the object. The phenomenon of winning bids exceeding 
true values is known as the winner’s curse (Milgrom, 1989). Signaling throughout the 
auction, as in an English auction, may also cause bidders to increase their estimates of an 
object’s value, if encouraged by other bidders with high value estimates. 
Independent private-values arise when the true value of something being 
auctioned is not universal. Each bidder will have a different value for an item, which is 
based on personal preferences, financial considerations, and tastes. A work of art by a 
master, tickets to a Hannah Montana concert, dinner at Applebees, or a new iPhone are 
all examples of private-value goods. Each bidder places a different value on the 
experience of owning, using, or consuming these items. Private values are less likely to 
be adjusted based on signaling from other bidders. However, bids may be placed in such 
a way to avoid revealing private values. 
Bidders have a personal value whether the object has a common or private value. 
A bidder’s personal value for an object includes the expected common or private value 
and the bidder’s desired profit or return from the object. For example, a bidder may 
expect the value of a jar of pennies to be $20, but considers counting and exchanging the 
pennies to be worth not less than $2 of their time. In such a case the bidder’s personal 
value for that jar of pennies would be $18, which is the maximum that buyer’s 
willingness to pay (WTP) for that object. 
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2.  First-price and Second-price Auctions 
In first-price auctions, the winner pays or receives what he or she bid. For 
example, in an art auction, the winner (highest bidder) pays the amount of his final bid. In 
a second-price auction, the price paid is the last bid where more than one bidder remained 
in competition. An example of the difference would be contractors bidding for a contract 
where cost was the sole factor. In either auction, the winner is the bidder submitting the 
lowest bid. In the first-price auction, the winner would be paid their bid, while in the 
second-price auction the winner would be paid the second lowest bid. 
3. Forward and Reverse Auctions 
Auctions may involve either the buyers or sellers changing their bids (Harden & 
Heyman, 2002, pp. 8-13). In forward auctions, buyers adjust their bid upwards until the 
objects are sold. Again, the art auction provides a good example. When bidding starts 
there may be more than a single interested buyer. As the bid is increased, buyers will 
drop out until only one buyer remains willing to pay the bid price. In a reverse auction, 
sellers change their bids downward. This normally occurs with a single buyer and 
multiple sellers (or suppliers). Parts suppliers bidding for government contracts are an 
example. All things being equal, the buyer in this case would select the lowest bid 
submitted. 
4. Open and Sealed-bid Auctions 
Bidding in auctions may be open or sealed. Open bid auctions provide for 
immediate feedback for all participants. Bidders constantly indicate their preferences 
while bidding is open. This may be accomplished by a live auctioneer standing in front of 
the room taking increasing (or decreasing) bids. It is also common on internet sites such 
as E-bay that show the current high bid from bidders around the world. Conversely, 
sealed bid auctions do not advertise bidder intentions. Bidders provide their bids to the 
auctioneer secretly. At the close of bidding (normally a specified time), the auctioneer 
reviews all the bids and then announces the winner and the final price.  
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5. Single and Multi-object Auctions 
Auctions may be for a single object at a time, or for more than one object at the 
same time. The criterion for ending a single object auction is normally when the 
auctioneer can match a single seller with a single buyer, through ascending or descending 
bids.  
Multi-object auctions are more complex. The auctioneer will have to match 
multiple objects from one or more sellers to one or more buyers. Multiple objects could 
be sold through multiple single object auctions, but that may cause inefficiencies for the 
buyer or seller. Multiple single object auctions cannot capture the effects of 
interdependent utility functions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Weber, 1979). For example, the 
government sells the rights to use ranges of radio frequency by auction. Typically, the 
total range of frequency available is broken into smaller ranges (blocks). Buyers are 
interested in specific ranges that may include several blocks for sale. Buyers have an 
expected value for that range of frequencies, but may expect that any less than the full 
range desired would not generate income. Such buyers would not have the same incentive 
to bid in single object auctions where they could not be guaranteed winning all of the 
desired frequency range. 
6. Risk Neutrality 
The expected value of an object is the product of the value of an object and the 
probability that an object would be obtained. Consider a lottery where the winnings could 
be $100 and only 100 tickets are sold. Each ticket then has a 1/100 chance of winning, so 
the expected value of each ticket is $1. A risk neutral person is indifferent between two 
choices where the expected value is the same (Davis & Holt, 1993, p. 73). A risk neutral 
person would be indifferent between an offer of $1 cash or a single ticket in the described 
lottery. A risk-averse person prefers a more certain outcome, and would prefer the $1 
cash. Conversely, a risk-seeking person would choose the lottery ticket. 
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C. TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
Single object auctions can normally be identified as one of four basic types: 
English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid (Klemperer, 2004, p. 
11). Strategies described assume risk neutral bidders. 
1. English Auction 
The English Auction, also known as ascending-bid, is generally a forward type 
auction where bids are gradually raised until only a single bidder remains. A key 
component to this type of auction is its openness. Bidders have some knowledge of 
WTPs of other bidders by knowing when their competition ceases to bid. The bidder with 
the highest WTP for the auctioned object wins when they make the last (highest) 
uncontested bid. The added surplus (presumably WTP includes the bidders required 
return from the object) winners receive is the difference between their WTP and what 
they pay (the final bid).   
The dominant strategy for all bidders is to continue bidding as long as their WTP 
for the object remains above the current bid (Milgrom, 1989, p. 8). If a bidder attempts to 
gain a higher surplus by not continuing to bid up to their WTP they will not make any 
gain when the object goes to another bidder. Similarly, someone bidding above their 
WTP will lose surplus in an attempt to ensure winning the object. Bidders also have the 
incentive not to increase the bid amount more than the required increment since that 
could result in a winning bid higher than necessary to beat the bidder with the second 
highest WTP.  
2. Dutch Auction 
The Dutch auction is characterized by bids descending from a price higher than 
any bidder is willing to pay. The first person to signal an acceptance of the bid price wins 
the object. The winner is most likely to be the bidder with the highest WTP, but that is 
not ensured.  
Unlike the English auction, there is no dominant bidding strategy in the Dutch 
auction (Milgrom, 1989, p. 8). In the English auction, the winning bid is just above the 
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WTP for all other bidders. Bidders do not have to estimate each other’s WTPs since they 
are signaled throughout the bidding round. In Dutch auctions, competing bidders only 
observe the winning bid. Bidders can only increase their surplus by extending the auction 
by waiting until the bid has dropped below their WTP (whereas in an English auction a 
buyer cannot improve their surplus by extending the auction). As bidders wait in a Dutch 
auction the surplus they win increases, but the probability they will win decreases. It is 
not possible to know how long to wait to reach the optimum bidding amount. The 
incentive for bidders is to allow the bid to drop to some point below their WTP, but just 
above what they expect all other bidders with lower WTPs to bid. This makes the Dutch 
auction much less truth revealing than the English auction. In addition, unless bidders 
have the same expectation about the distribution of WTP values, the Dutch auction is also 
less efficient because the object may not be won by the bidder with the highest WTP (i.e., 
the bidder who would receive the greatest benefit for the object being sold). 
3. First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 
In sealed-bid type auctions, bids are kept secret among the bidders. Bids are 
opened by the auctioneer to determine the winning bid. Sealed-bid auctions may be 
forward or reverse type auctions (many buyers bidding or many sellers bidding), thus the 
winning bid may either be the highest bid (among many buyers) or the lowest bid (among 
many sellers).  As in the Dutch auction, the incentive in a first-price sealed bid auction is 
for buyers to bid below their WTP and above what they expect other buyers with lower 
WTPs to bid. As such, it is not a truth revealing auction and may not be efficient. 
4. Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 
In a second-price sealed-bid auction the winner pays the amount of the first 
excluded bid. Bids are still made secretly and the winner is determined by the auctioneer. 
For example, if the bids for a case of wine were $110, $105, $90, and $85, the bidder 
making the $110 bid would win the wine at a price of $105. The auctioneer essentially 
takes on the role of bidders reacting to the signals of other bidders in an English auction. 
A second-price sealed-bid auction leads to a dominant strategy of bidding WTP. The 
arguments for not bidding above or below WTP are the same as for English auctions. 
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D. MATCHING THEORY 
Auctions assume that only one side of the market (buyers or sellers) has 
preferences. For example, in an English auction, only buyers have preferences for objects 
while the seller has no preference among buyers (other than preferring the buyer making 
the highest bid). Additionally, auctions normally match one buyer to one seller at a time. 
Matching theory involves multiple buyers and sellers who both have preferences.  
The most often used example is the marriage game (Roth & Sotomayor, 1990, pp. 
9-30). In this theoretical game, there is a defined set of men and women. Men have an 
ordered preference for each of the women, and women have an ordered preference for 
each of the men. The preferences could also include not willing to accept a proposed 
match (i.e., willing to stay single rather than marry the available possibilities), or equal 
preference among different match possibilities. Each marriage could only be one man and 
one woman. A stable set of matches is one where no potential partners not matched in a 
marriage would both prefer one another to the partners to whom they are matched.  
A mechanism for making stable marriage matches would involve multiple rounds 
of temporary matches. For example, each man could attempt to match himself with his 
highest preference. Women would reject all but the most preferred man making a 
proposal (and would reject any unacceptable proposed matches). Unmatched men would 
then match themselves to their next preferred woman. Women again would reject all but 
the most preferred man making a proposed match (a woman would take the best choice 
from either round one or two). The process would continue until all men and women are 
matched, or no further women remain that unmatched men would prefer to marry rather 
than remaining single. An alternative stable mechanism would have the roles reversed, 
with women proposing matches and men accepting or rejecting those matches. 
The marriage example can easily be applied to a job market. Job seekers would 
have preferences among the available jobs, which could be expressed as the minimum 
salary they would be willing-to-accept (WTA) to take the job. Similarly, employers 
would have preferences among all the available job seekers that would be expressed as a 
maximum salary they are willing-to-pay (WTP) for that potential employee. The job-
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seeker’s surplus from any match would be the salary he receives minus his WTA for that 
job, while the employer’s surplus would be its WTP for that employee minus the salary 
paid. A stable matching mechanism would match job seekers to jobs at a salary between 
their WTA and the employers’ WTP. In addition, a stable matching mechanism must also 
have the feature that it generates no combination of employer and job seeker who are not 
matched to each other but for whom there is some salary at which they would both prefer 
to be matched to each other as opposed to the partners to whom they are matched by the 
mechanism. Again, the possibility would exist for some seekers or jobs to remain 
unmatched. 
Matching mechanisms may be more beneficial to one side or the other. Consider 
the marriage matching mechanisms described above. While both are stable, the former 
mechanism in which men propose yields better outcomes for the men (it is “man 
optimal”) while the latter mechanism in which women propose yields better outcomes for 
the women (it is “woman optimal”). In particular, the former mechanism will tend to give 
better (more preferred) matches to men who make the proposals than women who can 
only accept or reject proposals (there is no guarantee that a women’s most preferred man 
will ever propose to her, giving her the chance to reject less preferred men). Matching 
mechanisms for job markets will be similarly optimized to employees or employers, 
depending on who makes the initial offer matching proposals. As such, a greater share of 
economic surplus can be expected to be earned by the side making the initial proposal. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Auctions are a common mechanism to transfer objects and money between buyers 
and sellers. The English and second-price sealed-bid auctions are most truth revealing 
and efficient of the four common types. However, auctions normally assume that only 
buyers or sellers have preferences, and that one object at a time will be sold. Matching 
theory addresses cases where buyers and sellers both have preferences, and where 
multiple objects must be matched between buyers and sellers at the same time. Matching 
mechanisms tend to be optimized for one side over the other. 
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III. APPLICATIONS OF AUCTIONS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN 
THE MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The total pay sailors receive each pay period varies based mainly on their pay 
grade, time in service, skill set, and assignment location. Some non-monetary incentives 
and sea/shore rotation management are also used. Each type of pay is used as a retention 
tool or incentive to take a certain billet. All pays, except Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP), 
are set centrally by the Navy without sailor interaction. AIP is very specific to location 
and skill set, and is set in conjunction with sailors through an auction matching process. 
The process can match sailors to billets by maximizing the economic surplus gained by 
either the sailors or the Navy. The method chosen will also influence how sailors may try 
to game the system. The method used for AIP seems to shift the surplus to the Navy, and 
considers more factors than the sailor’s AIP bid. 
B. TRADITIONAL ASSIGNMENT INCENTIVES 
1. Monetary Incentives 
Total compensation paid to sailors varies with many factors (e.g., sailor’s pay 
grade and skill set, billet location). The primary source of compensation is basic pay. The 
amount of basic pay is determined by the sailor’s pay grade and amount of time in 
service. There is no differentiation across job types or location and pay is consistent 
across the services. Sailors are also paid basic allowance for subsistence, based on pay 
grade, marital status, and availability of enlisted dining facilities. These two basic pays 
are retention oriented, rather than being assignment incentives. 
Several types of pay are based on the sailor’s duty location. These include basic 
allowance for housing, overseas housing allowance, and cost of living allowance. These 
allowances are common across services, and do not depend on the sailor’s specialty or 
job type, but are variable by pay grade and marital status. These allowances are set to 
provide sailors comparable purchasing power regardless of location, and are not intended 
to entice a sailor to one location over another. Some locations may also qualify as a tax 
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free exclusion zone (for enlisted personnel, no pay is subject to federal income tax while 
stationed in the zone), while some other locations qualify for hardship duty pay. Sailors 
may also qualify for overseas extension pay. Career sea pay also depends on location 
(specifically, assigned to a sea-going billet). These latter location specific pays are 
intended to entice one location choice over another. 
Some compensation schemes target specific skill sets. Selective reenlistment 
bonus (SRB) rates depend on the sailor’s specialty and time in service. Sailors must 
accept follow-on assignment to be eligible for SRB, but the SRB amount does not vary 
by location.  
The final type of monetary compensation varies by location, job type, pay grade, 
and skill set. Special Operations Command assignment incentive pay is an example, as is 
special duty assignment pay. These special pays are set by the Navy without direct 
negotiation with sailors (Command, 2007). The rates are based on historical data, and 
attempt to attract volunteers with specific qualifications to billets in specific locations by 
sailor skill set (each billet with similar requirements is entitled to the same pay). AIP 
differs from all the other pay schemes in that the sailor negotiates (through an auction 
mechanism) the amount of pay with the Navy. Consequently two similarly skilled sailors 
in similar billets may be paid differently. 
2. Non-monetary Compensations 
The Navy employs a number of non-monetary compensation schemes as well. 
Programs include quality of life issues, such as low cost recreation programs and health 
care, education opportunities or other programs generically designed to retain sailors. 
More specifically targeted programs include improved choices for follow on assignment, 
improved advancement opportunities, and managing sea/shore rotation.  
Most shore duty assignments are considered desirable (i.e., sufficient numbers of 
sailors volunteer for the assignment). Some of these billets could be filled by civilians, 
but the Navy fills them with sailors to ensure there are enough non-sea going billets 
available for sailors. Other shore duty assignments are of a type that must be filled by 
sailors. Not all of these latter assignments are desirable.  
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The Navy manages filling sea billets primarily by setting sea/shore rotation 
requirements by sailor specialty. For example, an aviation electrician may be required to 
fill a sea going billet 48 months for every 30 months they fill a non-sea going billet. 
Excessive sea time affects retention, so managing sea/shore rotation is a retention issue. 
Studies have shown career sea pay is also effective at raising retention rates (H. L. W. 
Golding & Gregory, 2001). The Navy also gives sea duty credit (but not sea pay) for 
certain critical shore billets that have proven difficult to fill. These billets are less 
desirable than other shore billets, but more desirable than sea going billets. This has the 
effect of decreasing sailor’s at sea time (raising retention) and increasing the volunteer 
rate for those hard to fill billets.  
The Center for Naval Analyses estimates giving sea duty credit as an enticement 
for undesirable shore billets costs the Navy $83 million to $195 million per year in excess 
end strength costs (Golfin, Lien, & Gregory, 2004). These billets require higher end 
strength because they count against the sea portion of the sea/shore rotation, establishing 
the need for more shore billets coded as shore billets, driving up the required end strength 
number. The savings projected assume that all sea duty coded shore billets are converted 
to shore duty coded billets on the AIP system, and excess shore billets are outsourced. 
In some cases, sailors must be assigned to billets involuntarily. This increases the 
chances that the sailor will leave the Navy, resulting in additional recruiting and training 
costs. Sailors involuntarily assigned to billets will receive all current compensations for 
that billet except AIP1. 
C. AUCTION MECHANISM CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN 
THE NAVY 
The Navy must choose an auction format and design to implement the AIP 
program based on the Navy’s preferences for economic efficiency, cost effectiveness, 
equity, and practicality (Homb, 2006; Tan, 2006). Stokey and Zeckhauser’s (1978) rule 
for economic efficiency is “in any choice situation, select the alternative that produces the 
 
1 All pays and allowances, except AIP, are like government entitlements: they are paid automatically 
to each qualifying sailor. 
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greatest net benefit” for all parties. Net benefit, or economic surplus, is the difference 
between how much a sailor is paid to fill a billet (all pays including AIP) minus the 
minimum he would be willing to accept to fill the billet, plus the difference between the 
value the Navy places on the services of that sailor in the billet and the total amount of 
compensation paid (all pays including AIP). The sailor will receive benefit from the AIP 
system only if he is chosen for an AIP assignment. Note that, if all sailors were equally 
qualified for a billet, the Navy would realize the greatest benefit from choosing the 
lowest cost sailor (lowest bid and transfer cost combination).  
As a baseline, suppose that (1) cost were the only consideration in filling billets, 
(2) there were significantly more sailors competing for billets than there were AIP billets 
available, and (3) there was minimal chance that the same sailor would be the low cost 
sailor (lowest bid and transfer cost) for more than one billet.  Under these extreme 
conditions, either the English or sealed bid second price auction formats theoretically will 
ensure sailors bid closest to their true values. Cost effectiveness suggests that priority 
should be given to distributing surplus value to the Navy. All the auction formats 
theoretically produce the same surplus given risk-neutral sailors bidding. If sailors are 
risk averse2, however, Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions transfer the most surplus 
value to the Navy.  
Equity is fairness among sailors, and may mean equal pay or equal benefit 
(surplus)3. No auction format would result in equal AIP awards across all sailors in all 
locations. That inequity is by design; rather, the goal is for equal benefit across locations. 
Since Dutch and sealed-bid first-price auctions will result in less variation in sailor 
surplus (the difference between AIP paid and the reservation values), they both provide 
more equal benefit among sailors.  
Finally, regardless of efficiency, effectiveness, or equity preferences, the format 
chosen must be practical to implement. Both English and Dutch auctions would require 
conducting the auction at the same time for all participants. Since sailors are deployed 
 
2 For example, sailors adjust bids to increase chance of winning billet because increased competition 
or other factors reduce the chance of winning a desired billet, 
3 Surplus is the difference between sailor’s reservation price and they bid. 
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throughout the world, working inflexible shifts or critical, time-dependent tasks, it would 
be impractical to conduct the auction at the same time (even with the use of the internet 
or video conferencing). Sealed bid auctions allow bids to be made at anytime (within a 
bidding window), and may be done when a sailor has the time.  
Thus, if traditional auctions were the only mechanisms under consideration, the 
choice would then become whether to use first or second price auctions. First price 
auctions are preferred when considering effectiveness and equity, while second price is 
preferred when considering efficiency. 
D. COMPLICATIONS WITH USE OF AUCTIONS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN 
THE NAVY 
Auction theory normally assumes that sellers have no preference for one buyer 
over another, only a preference to maximize their own surplus. Since the Navy does have 
preferences for some sailors over others, the potential for gaming the system (not bidding 
their true value) exists with AIP. The Center for Naval Analyses discusses six scenarios 
of gaming (H. L. Golding & Cox, 2003). 
There are three conditions that may lead to sailors bidding higher than their true 
value: little perceived weight of the AIP bid in selecting the sailor; desirable non-AIP 
billets available; and low competition for specific billets. A perceived high risk of being 
involuntarily assigned to another more undesirable billet will likely cause a sailor to bid a 
low amount for an AIP billet that is also not desired (“the lesser of two evils”)4. The 
amount of knowledge that sailors may have about what the competition is bidding for a 
desired billet may also lead sailors to not bid their true value.  
Sailors could raise the overall level of AIP paid if they all colluded to bid high. 
However, the risk of this kind of collusion among applicants is assessed to be low since 
AIP cycles are relatively short and sailors bidding have no easy way of communicating 
among themselves. Collusion would require knowing who else is in the detailing 
window, who desires the same assignment, and how to contact them. These sailors are 
 
4 While this may save the Navy money in the short term, it may adversely affect that sailor’s retention 
decision. 
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generally geographically dispersed, with some on deployment or away from base on 
training for deployment, home based throughout the country, and probably working 
different shifts.  
Homb (2006) suggests that sailors have an incentive to overbid their WTA when 
they know there is limited competition for a billet, and the Navy will be forced to assign 
someone to that billet (these billets, by definition are hard to fill and essential to the 
Navy). Another complication arises from the two sided nature of the detailing process. 
The Navy is not just concerned with finding the minimum AIP amount (a one sided 
scenario), but is also concerned with the quality of fit of the sailor (e.g., cost to move, 
required en-route training, experience). Sailors may tend to overbid when they are a high 
quality fit for a billet For example, previous laboratory simulations of the current AIP 
system showed that sailors would increase their bids by about 6% for every 10% increase 
in their perceived qualifications, even if their true reservation wage or willingness-to-
accept were unchanged (Coughlan and Gates, presentation to the Annual Navy 
Workforce Research and Analysis Conference, May 2, 2007, Arlington, VA). Both of 
these situations not only could significantly increase the cost of the AIP system but could 
also impact the ability of the Navy to assign a quality fit sailor to a billet if the bid that 
sailor put in was above the Navy’s WTP for that sailor, or the bid in comparison to other 
sailors’ bids and qualities led to a lower quality choice for a billet than was necessary.  
E. AUCTION MECHANISMS 
Homb (2006) proposed a mechanism combining two sided matching theory and 
auction theory based on work by Roth and Sotomayor (1990). The mechanism is similar 
to a sealed bid second price auction employing two sided matching theory. Homb’s 
proposal allows candidates to bid only for jobs for which they are qualified. Next, 
reservation prices (caps) are set for each job, following which the candidates make their 
bids. The auctioneer sets the payment level at the cap for each job, and matches 
candidates to jobs based on candidate surplus. Where multiple candidates match a single 
job, payment levels are lowered and candidates are again matched by surplus. This 
process is repeated until there are one-to-one matches for bidders and jobs. Tan (2006) 
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modified this mechanism by allowing the starting salary for a billet to vary by sailor. Tan 
termed this mechanism the sailor-optimal model, and also proposed a variation. Her 
billet-optimal model alternative made matches based on best surplus accruing to the 
employer from all the filled jobs. 
F. CURRENT ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
Local commanders have some say in which sailors are assigned to their 
command. Sailors state their billet preferences online through the Career Management 
System (CMS, formerly JASS). CMS allows sailors to view billets available, information 
on how qualified they are for the billet, and information on costs the Navy will incur to 
transfer them to the new billet. CMS also indicates the compensation associated with the 
billet, and is the method that sailors bid for AIP if it is applicable to the billet. Commands 
then review the various applicants for their billets and enter their preferences for sailors 
into CMS. Finally, the detailers match sailors to billets. Where there is competition for an 
AIP billet, the sailor with the lower bid will normally be assigned, but costs associated 
with transfer and en route training will also be considered. Difficulties arise when 
detailers cannot match command and sailor preferences. Based on priorities, some billets 
may go unfilled, and some sailors may be involuntarily assigned to high priority billets. 
Each command has a set billet structure. That structure is set centrally to best 
enable the command to achieve its mission balanced against the overall availability of 
sailors. It does not react to changing mission requirements levied on the command, nor 
are the actual abilities of sailors assigned to a command considered. As a result, where 
one command may have the same billets open as another command at the same location, 
they may not place the same priority on filling these billets. AIP currently assigns the 
same priority to all similar jobs in the same area. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter put AIP in context with the other pays a sailor may receive, either for 
general retention, or to encourage specific skill sets or location choice. AIP is unique in 
that it is the only pay negotiated with sailors (through a sealed-bid auction matching 
mechanism). There are two new proposed generic methods for matching sailors to AIP 
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billets, differing by whether matches are made according to sailor or Navy surplus. 
Currently, the assignment process is done online, and involves the sailors, gaining 
commands, and the Navy assignment personnel. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF THE AUCTION 
MECHANISMS 
A. PREVIOUS SIMULATION RESULTS 
Tan (2006) simulated the two matching algorithms on Excel spreadsheets 
generating random numbers for willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay 
(WTP). Tan presents the results for simulating the matching algorithms under five 
general categories: 1. Overall system performance, 2. Sailor value measures, 3. Billet 
value measures, 4. Cost measures, and 5. Quality measures. Averages are presented to 
two decimal points, and the range of values is presented below the average, indicated by 
[]. Results are from 1,000 trials of the algorithms. 
1. Overall System Performance 
Table 1 presents the overall system performance measures for the two algorithms. 
“Solutions?” indicate whether the algorithm found a solution within 200 iterations of the 
matching loop. “Rounds” is the number of iterations of the matching loop required to 
obtain a solution. A solution matches no more than one sailor to each billet and each 
sailor to no more than one billet. “% of Sailors Assigned” and “% of Billets Filled” 
measure the quality of the solutions found. Where the number of billets available equals 
number of sailors bidding, these two percentages will be the same. Finally, “Ave Total 
Surplus/UB” compares the difference between WTP and WTA (the average of the total 
surplus across all matches) to the maximum WTP (UB).  
The results show that the algorithm clearly works (finding at least one match) all 
the time, and usually finds a full set of matches between sailors and billets. The 
simulation indicated that the average total monthly economic surplus gained by sailors 
and billets was 57% of the maximum possible surplus range, meaning on average sailors 
and billets gained $1,140 economic benefit each bidding period5. 
 
5 The simulation was based on the range of possible AIP values being $0 to $2,000. Currently the 
maximum AIP allowed by the Navy for any billet is $1,700. The equivalent economic benefic would then 
be $970. 
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Table 1.   Overall System Performance Measures (from Tan, 2006) 
Models Overall System Performance 






















2. Sailor Value and Billet Value Measures 
Table 2 presents the value measures from the sailor point of view. As above, 
average total surplus is the average of WTP minus WTA for each match in each matching 
period. Average sailor surplus is the average of the AIP minus WTA for each match in 
each matching period. The average AIP is the average AIP value for matched sailors. 
Table 3 shows the similar results from the billet point of view. In this case, billet surplus 
is WTP minus AIP level. An economic surplus in favor of the sailor indicates that sailors 
would be paid more money than required to compensate them for that billet, while an 
economic surplus in favor of the billet indicates that the billet gains more value from the 
sailor than it pays. Since no match can be made above a billet’s (or below a sailor’s) 
value, the worst a sailor or billet can do is break even. 
Tan’s simulations demonstrated that three-quarters of the economic surplus 
accrues to the sailor under the sailor-optimal method, while the opposite is true under the 
billet-optimal method. This equates to $820 surplus accruing to the sailor, and $280 
accruing to the billet, under the sailor-optimal method. Once again, those values are 
reversed for billet-optimal method. On average, 65% of the total AIP amounts paid 
provide sailor surplus (value above the minimum acceptable amounts) under sailor-
optimal method, while only 38% of total AIP generates sailor surplus under the billet- 
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optimal method. Billet surplus, on the other hand, constituted 19% and 54% of the 
amount billets were willing-to-pay under sailor-optimal and billet optimal methods 
respectively.  
Table 2.   Sailor Value Measures (from Tan, 2006) 
Models Sailor Value Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 
Average Sailor Surplus/ 


















Table 3.   Billet Value Measures (from Tan, 2006) 
Models Billet Value Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 
Average Billet Surplus/ 


















3.  Cost and Quality Measures 
Cost measures (Table 4) evaluated manpower costs that would be incurred based 
on the matches, while quality measures (Table 5) were concerned with quality of sailors 
matched to billets. The ratio of average AIP to maximum value for surplus (UB) shows 
that AIPs averaged 64% of maximum achievable WTA or WTP for sailor-optimal 
methods, and only 36% for billet-optimal method. By comparing ratios of each sailor’s 
AIP to their WTP, it appears that the sailor is paid a significant portion his value to the 
billet (the sailor’s quality) in the sailor-optimal method, but less than half of this value in 
the billet-optimal method (81% and 46% respectively for sailor- and billet-optimal 
methods). Both methods assign sailors well qualified for billets. Seventy-eight percent of 
the maximum possible quality was captured (comparing average AIP to the maximum 
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achievable WTA or WTP), and 85% of each billet’s possible quality was captured 
(comparing the matched sailor’s WTP to max WTP for any sailor in each billet).  
Since the matching process places a different value on each sailor, it is possible to 
show the cost of considering the value of a sailor to individual billets. Always matching 
to the least cost sailor can be done by setting all WTPs to the upper bound. Conversely, 
always matching the most qualified sailor to the billet can be done by setting all WTAs to 
zero. Considering sailors’ value to billets increases the cost of AIP overall by 309% and 
173% for the sailor- and billet- optimal methods respectively. Sailors matched by both 
methods reflect 91% of the value available to the billets. 
Table 4.   Cost Measures (from Tan, 2006) 
Models Cost Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 








Avg AIP (Current Model) / Avg AIP 






Table 5.   Quality Measures (from Tan, 2006) 
Models Quality Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 








Avg WTP (current model) / Avg WTP 






4. Conclusions from the Simulation 
The simulations demonstrated that both matching mechanisms were effective at 
matching qualified sailors to billets. The sailor-optimal method generated greater benefits 
for the sailor, and was more costly overall, than the billet-optimal method. However, both 
methods made about the same quality of matches. Considering only the simulations, the 
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billet optimal method would be the more cost effective of the two methods to use. The 
simulation assumes sailors accurately determine and truthfully signal their WTA6, and 
that the Navy accurately assigns WTP values to each sailor.  
Sailors do not have an incentive to inflate their WTA values in the sailor-optimal 
method because the AIP amount for matched billets depends on WTP (an inflated WTA 
would not increase AIP, but may prevent a beneficial match). However, if sailors know 
they are better match for a billet, those sailors could, in some cases, increase the AIP paid 
under the billet-optimal method for those match by inflating their WTA. Therefore, 
sailors are more likely to advertise their true WTA under the sailor-optimal method. The 
reverse arguments can be made to show the opposite is true for billet WTP valuations 
(sailor-optimal is less truth revealing than billet-optimal). Tan (2006, p. 45) proposes that 
“it is more likely for sailors to know billet preferences than for billets to accurately guess 
sailor preferences.” She proposes a laboratory experiment to determine if the sailor-
optimal method would be sufficiently truth revealing to make the sailor-optimal method 
cost effective. 
B. VERIFICATION OF EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM 
The experiment program developed for this research was tested by simulating 10 
subjects participating in 60 rounds of bidding (30 each using the two matching 
mechanisms). The same performance measures that Tan (2006) calculated for the 
simulations were calculated for the 60 trial runs of the program (except where similar 
data could not be collected). Tables 6-10 show that the experimental program was nearly 
as efficient at making matches as the simulation, with similar surpluses being generated. 
All the tables include minimum, maximum and standard deviations for the values 
presented. The number of cycles to make matches was not measured in the experimental 
program, as this appears to be meaningless with the amount of computing power 
available. Due to the setup of the program, its matches could not be compared to linear 
programmed determined matches, nor could matches be re-run with WTPs set to  
 
6 A truthful valuation of WTA is the minimum amount of AIP that would leave the sailor satisfied 
working in that particular billet. 
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minimum and maximum ranges. From these results, it can be concluded that the 
experimental program implements the matching mechanism in the same way as Tan’s 
simulation.   
Table 6.   Overall System Performance Measures. 








% of Sailors 
Assigned 
95.33% (-0.45%) 
[min 80.00%, max 100.00%, 
std 5.71%] 
92.33% (-3.34%) 
[min 80.00%, max 100.00%,  
std 7.74%] 
% of Billets Filled 95.33% (-0.45%) 
[min 80.00%, max 100.00%, 
std 5.71%] 
92.33% (-3.34%) 





[min 45.83%, max 69.50%, 
std 5.53%] 
59.09% (+2.44%) 
[min 48.25%, max 69.38%, 
std 5.85%] 
Table 7.   Sailor Value Measures. 
Models Sailor Value Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 
Average Sailor Surplus/ 
Average Total Surplus 
72.30% (-1.99%) 
[min 13.96%, max  89.94%, 
std 15.77%] 
27.34% (+1.73%) 
[min 6.60%, max 55.59%, 
std 13.01%] 
Average Sailor Surplus/ 
Range 
40.77% (-1.36) 
[min 7.01%, max 57.49%, 
std 10.07%] 
16.16% (+1.74) 
[min 4.23%, max 30.75%, 
std 7.74%] 
Average Sailor Surplus/ 
Avg AIP 
65.47% (-0.07%) 
[min 24.17%, max 76.32%, 
std 10.24%] 
44.00% (+5.68%) 
[min 12.34%, max 67.35%, 
std 14.83%] 
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Table 8.   Billet Value Measures 
Models Billet Value Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 
Average Billet Surplus/ 
Average Total Surplus 
27.70% (+1.99%) 
[min 10.06%, max 86.04%, 
std 15.77] 
72.66% (-1.73%) 
[min 44.41%, max 93.40%, 
std 13.01] 
Average Billet Surplus/ 
Range 
15.62% (+1.17%) 
[min 5.81%, max 43.24%, 
std 8.43%] 
42.93% (+0.70%) 
[min 24.56%, max 59.78%, 
std 8.80%] 
Average Billet Surplus/ 
Avg WTP 
20.34% (+1.83%) 
[min 7.15%, max 59.84%,  
std 11.68%] 
53.97% (+0.17%) 
[min 30.00%, max 83.89%, 
std 11.13%] 
Table 9.   Cost Measures. 
Models Cost Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 
Avg AIP / Range 62.27% (-1.68%) 
[min 29.01%, max 77.79%, 
std 11.19%] 
36.72% (+.49%) 
[min 11.48%, max 57.31%, 
std 9.17%] 
Avg (AIP / WTP) 80.34% (-1.15%) 
[min 39.33%, max 92.97%,  
std 11.47%] 
45.88% (-0.32%) 
[min 13.97%, max 68.98%, 
std 11.04%] 
Table 10.   Quality Measures 
Models Quality Measures 
Sailor-Optimal Billet-Optimal 
Avg WTP / range 77.89% (-0.51%) 
[min 62.50%, max 88.00%, 
std 5.81%] 
79.66% (+1.2%) 
[min 70.28%, max 88.89%, 
std 4.93%] 
Avg (WTP / Max WTP) 92.25% (+6.51%) 
[min 86.97%, max 97.00%, 
std 2.54%] 
93.65% (+7.84%) 
[min 89.61%, max 97.49%, 
std 2.07%] 
 
C. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
The experimental setup is for a market type experiment (Norton, 2007). Subjects 
are told they are managers seeking employment, and are given a list of potential jobs with 
information about their WTA and WTP for those jobs, and the matching mechanism to be 
used. The jobs are generic. Random values for WTA and WTP simulate all the factors 
that job seekers and hiring managers would evaluate to determine actual WTA and WTP 
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values. Experimental subjects make their bids for the various jobs online during a set 
bidding period. Following the close of the bidding period, the program makes matches 
based on WTP and bids, and displays the employee job matches and matched salary. 
Participants should be paid cash at the end of the sessions based on their earned surpluses 
(salary matched minus WTA) from all the treatments. 
1. Selection of Experiment Subjects 
Navy enlisted sailors who are considering their next job assignment comprise the 
population that this experiment is intended to represent. To conduct the experiment at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), subjects may easily be drawn from the NPS student 
population, NPS Navy enlisted staff population, or the Navy student population at the 
Defense Language Institute (DLI). The subjects that would most closely match the target 
population would be the Navy enlisted staff at NPS. The Navy enlisted staff at NPS have 
generally been in the Navy for at least one prior assignment and will negotiate for a 
follow-on assignment from NPS. Thus they have similar experience levels to those of the 
target population. However, the population of the Navy staff at NPS is too small to 
provide sufficient test subjects.  
The next most similar set of test subjects would be the Navy students at DLI. 
They will have less experience with the Navy assignment process, but in some cases may 
be negotiating for their first assignment. The Navy student population at DLI should be 
large enough to draw sufficient volunteer subjects for the experiment. However, the 
experiment sessions would need to be conducted at DLI; scheduling and logistical set-up 
may be more difficult than conducting the sessions at NPS. Subjects may also be drawn 
from the student population at NPS. These subjects are predominantly officers (from all 
services, including foreign militaries). They do not follow the same assignment process 
as Navy enlisted members, but most have been through an assignment process where they 
had to consider the same factors valuing potential assignments. Subjects may be drawn 
from other groups as well (e.g., all DLI students or students at local colleges), although 
similarity to the target population will decrease, or logistical problems will increase. 
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Although subjects will not match the population affected by AIP, the incentives 
they will be given reflect the same incentives sailors would have when bidding for AIP 
(Davis & Holt, 1993). Recent experiments conducted both inside and outside laboratory 
environments demonstrate the exportability of laboratory results to a more general 
population (Güth, Schmidt, & Sutter, 2007). The incentive the experiment subjects will 
have to maximize their cash payments should reflect the incentives AIP participants 
would have to maximize their economic surplus from their matched assignments. 
Some demographic data should be collected from the experimental subjects to 
control for the effect motivation and experience differences may have upon the subjects’ 
tendency to bid their true WTA. Basic data such as age and sex should be collected, as 
well as military or civilian employment, rank in the military, education level, and 
economics background. Collecting information about rank in the military will indirectly 
indicate the amount of experience the subject has with the assignment process, and will 
allow for control between the officer and enlisted assignment processes. Information 
about education level and economics background is important to control for possible 
knowledge about optimal bidding strategies.    
2. Variations of Information to Provide to Subjects 
Subjects are given WTA, WTP information, and make bids by an online interface. 
WTAs and WTPs will be uniformly, randomly, distributed across some ranges. Subjects 
should be arranged in the experiment location so that they can not see information from 
other subjects in their cohort, and other communication during the treatments should be 
controlled.  
Total compensation paid to sailors assigned to AIP billets is a sum of the various 
set pays for that location and the sailor’s paygrade, plus the variable amount of AIP. This 
results in a well defined range of possible compensation amounts. Similarly, 
experimental WTA and WTP will be confined to a set range analogous to a set base pay 
plus a variable amount. A random uniform distribution of WTAs and WTPs within set 
ranges will be used to simulate the randomness of factors that drive WTA and WTP. The 
ranges for WTA and WTP may be set differently. 
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The number of subjects participating as a cohort may be varied, as may the 
number of jobs available in each treatment. Tan’s (2006) simulation involved 10 sailors 
competing for 10 assignments. The program was tested for these conditions. 
AIP amounts the Navy is willing to pay are made available to sailors during the 
bidding process, consequently the information available to test subjects regarding WTP is 
variable. Sailors know historical amounts of AIP paid to various assignments, and the 
maximum amount of AIP allowable under law. Giving test subjects the range of WTP 
mimics the kind of historical information sailors have. Although sailors would not know 
exactly how much the Navy would pay for them individually, they would have some idea 
of where they stand in relation to other sailors qualified for the same assignment. 
Similarly, test subjects are not given exact WTP information, but given a ranking of 
where they stand relative to the other test subjects, within the cohort, for a specific job, 
each bidding session. In the future, specificity of WTP ranking can be varied (from more 
limited information like “top half” to specifically “ranked 1 of 10”).  
3. Factors Affecting Compensation Paid to Experiment Subjects 
Research supports using monetary rewards as incentives in economic experiments 
to reduce irrational subject behavior (Smith & Walker, 1993). Compensation in 
experiments will encourage experimental subjects to make choices similar to the choices 
the subject population (sailors participating in the AIP program) would make. 
Compensation must be set high enough to influence experiment subject decisions, but not 
higher than the experimenters’ budget will allow. Customarily, experimental subjects are 
guaranteed a minimum compensation that is not affected by their choices. 
Monetary compensation is normally made at an exchange rate between 
experimental credits to cash. The experimental credits earned should be reflective of the 
choices being made in the experiment. In this experiment, subjects are told they are 
managers seeking employment; salaries will be between $40,000 and $80,000. Tan’s 
simulation did not use continuous values over the range of AIPs, but used 40 increments 
from minimum to maximum AIP values ($0 to $2,000 with an increment of $50). The 
equivalent increment for this experiment range is $1,000. 
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Tan (2006) calculated (average sailor surplus / range) for both matching 
mechanisms (sailor optimal = .4213, billet optimal = .1442). Multiplying these values by 
the salary range will give expected surplus per round (sailor optimal = $16,856, billet 
optimal $5,768). The total expected surplus for the entire experiment session of 10 sailor 
optimal treatments and 10 billet optimal treatments is $226,240. The appropriate 
exchange rate is found by dividing the total expected surplus by desired payout (220,240 
experiment $ / 20 real $ = 11,312). This calculated exchange rate assumes that 
experimental subjects will bid their WTA values, and that they bid on all available jobs. 
It is expected that subjects will use bidding strategies to increase their surplus, so the 
exchange rate may need to be adjusted upwards. 
D. PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
Various experimental parameters should be varied to measure their effects on the 
bidding strategies of experimental subjects. These include changing the matching 
mechanism, changing the amount of WTP information provided the subjects, changing 
the level of competition for the jobs, and possibly allowing communication during the 
experiment. The variations are summarized in Table 11.   
1. Matching Mechanism Used 
Experiment sessions should be conducted with each matching mechanism used 
for one-half of the treatments. It is anticipated that the sailor-optimal method will be 
more truth revealing than the job-optimal method. This can be confirmed by comparing 
the differences between bids and WTAs under each method. Multiple sessions should be 
conducted changing the order of method used to control for any learning effect in the 
successive treatments. Experimental sessions could also be conducted without disclosing 
the matching method used, but this would have no direct parallel to the AIP program 
itself. 
2. Fidelity of WTP Information 
Actual WTP values are not provided to sailors, and should not be provided to 
experiment subjects. The program is designed to give test subjects a ranking of their 
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WTP for each job as compared to the WTPs for the other subjects competing for each of 
those jobs. In the future the program will be able to display varying degrees of WTP 
ranking information from no ranking information to displaying absolute rank among 
competitors (e.g., that they rank 1 of 10, 2 of 20, 3 of 10, etc.). Displaying no ranking 
information would be analogous to sailors competing for an assignment where there were 
many possible competitors that all had comparable qualifications. Conversely, displaying 
absolute rank information would be analogous to a situation where all the sailors 
competing for an assignment know all the other competitors. In such a case, sailors would 
be able to measure their likely standing among their peers, but would still not know 
exactly how much the Navy would be willing to pay. 
Changing the fidelity of WTP information may influence bids by suggesting the 
amount of surplus available for each job. Subjects may attempt to increase their surplus 
by bidding higher or lower than their true WTA.  
3. Effects of Competition Level for a Job 
Sailors bidding for an assignment should have an idea about how much demand 
there is for that particular assignment (the simple fact that it is an AIP eligible assignment 
currently indicates that the assignment is less than desirable, and has low competition). 
The normal effects of higher demand leading to higher prices (more jobs available than 
willing sailors) might entice a sailor to raise their bid above their true WTA for a job. 
This can be tested in the experiment by making more or fewer jobs available in each 
treatment.  
4. Effects of Communication 
Tan (2006) suggests that the risk of collusion among participants is low. In most 
cases, sailors will not know whom they may be competing against for various 
assignments, and likely will not be collocated with those competitors. Preventing 
communication during the experiment treatments, and positioning subjects such that their 
information cannot be shared, emulates that environment. However, with today’s 
prevalence of internet communications (e.g., blogs) there is the possibility of collusion 
among AIP participants. Some experimental treatments should attempt to measure the 
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impact of collusion on bidding strategies by permitting some form of communications 
among the experiment subjects (e.g., talking or internet blog sites). 
Table 11.   Summary of Parameter Variations 
Set-up # Method1 WTP Fidelity2 Demand2 Communication 
1 1 High At None 
2 1 Medium At None 
3 1 Low At None 
4 1 High Over None 
5 1 Medium Over None 
6 1 Low Over None 
7 1 High Below None 
8 1 Medium Below None 
9 1 Low Below None 
10 2 High At None 
11 2 Medium At None 
12 2 Low At None 
13 2 High Over None 
14 2 Medium Over None 
15 2 Low Over None 
16 2 High Below None 
17 2 Medium Below None 
18 2 Low Below None 
19 1 High At Limited 
20 1 Medium At Limited 
21 1 Low At Limited 
22 1 High Over Limited 
23 1 Medium Over Limited 
24 1 Low Over Limited 
25 1 High Below Limited 
26 1 Medium Below Limited 
27 1 Low Below Limited 
28 2 High At Limited 
29 2 Medium At Limited 
30 2 Low At Limited 
31 2 High Over Limited 
32 2 Medium Over Limited 
33 2 Low Over Limited 
34 2 High Below Limited 
35 2 Medium Below Limited 
36 2 Low Below Limited 
Notes: 
1  Matching mechanism. 1 = sailor optimal (seeker optimal), 2 = billet optimal (job optimal) 
2  Fidelity of WTP ranking. High = absolute rank (1 of 10, 2 of 10, etc.), medium = thirds (top third, middle 
third, bottom third), low = everyone the same rank 
3  Number of jobs compared to number of subjects: at = same number of jobs as subjects, over = less jobs 
than number of subjects, below= more jobs than number of subjects 
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E. EXPERIMENT TRIAL RUN 
A trial run of the experiment was conducted to test the program and user 
interface, evaluate the experiment instructions and verify the suitability of the exchange 
rate. Twenty students from the NPS Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
(GSBPP) volunteered as experimental subjects. The trial was conducted in a GSPBB 
facility using the NPS standard computer configuration connected to the internet. The 
instructions provided to the subjects are included as Appendix A. Subjects were paid cash 
at the end of the experiment, ranging from $14.50 to $32.50 with $24.50 being the 
average (payouts were rounded up to the next $0.25). Ten bidding sessions were 
conducted using set-up conditions #2 and #20 (from Table 11).  
1. Preliminary Observations from Trial Run 
Although problems with the program affected the trial results, some preliminary 
observations may be made. Figure 1 shows more bids, on average, were above their 
WTA under the billet-optimal model (solid line with circles) than with the sailor-optimal 
model (solid line with squares). Figure 1 also shows the positive correlation between 
average bid strategy and average surplus earned (dashed lines) per round, and that 
subjects earned more surplus with the sailor-optimal model. 




























The data from the trial runs strongly support the need for further experimental 
testing. The experimental subjects did not normally bid their WTA values (statistical 
analysis of variance shows bids did not equal WTA at confidence levels above 99%). 
Figures 2 and 3 show bidding strategies (difference between bid and WTA). Figure 2 is 
the frequency distribution of bidding strategy for all bids made during the trial run. For 
both the sailor-optimal and billet-optimal matching models, most bids were between $0 
and $5,000 above the WTA amount.  More bids tended to be further above WTA under 
the billet-optimal model than the sailor-optimal model. Figure 3 shows bidding strategies 
only for matches. It shows that the majority of bids making matches were below WTA. A 
regression of bid strategies against surpluses shows no correlation between strategies and 
surpluses earned for the sailor-optimal model, but a strong correlation in the billet 
optimal model (surplus = $1,401 + 0.9737 * (bid – WTA), adjusted R2 = 96.0%, 


















































































2. Program and User Interface 
Experiment subjects understood and were able to use the program interface 
without additional assistance after being read the instructions. A problem in the 
program’s data verification routine did cause participants to fail to make bids a total of 
four times (out of 400 chances). The program always made a set of matches, however 
match rate was only 76%. This lower than predicted match rate was partially caused by 
four problems: the subjects’ bid entries, the data verification problem7, a low limit to 
matching cycles8, and the setting for the salary increment9. The experiment subjects 
                                                 
7 To be corrected before further experimental runs with volunteers. 
8 Matching cycles had been limited to 20 during program development for troubleshooting purposes. 
That restriction had not been removed prior to the trial. This restriction has been removed. The data in 
Paragraph B of this chapter was collected after removing this restriction. 
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were expected to vary their bidding strategy in an attempt to increase their earned 
surplus. It appears that the program interface did provide the subjects sufficient feedback 
to adjust their bid.  
3.  Experiment Instructions 
The experiment instructions (script and accompanying PowerPoint slides) are 
included at Appendix A. They were presented in two parts: prior to starting the bidding 
rounds, the experiment scenario, first matching mechanism, and program interface were 
described to the subjects; after the first ten bidding rounds, the second matching 
mechanism was described. Total time to present the instructions was approximately 30 
minutes.  
The experimental subjects did not have any questions about the program 
interface; however, several questions remained about the matching mechanism processes 
and surplus calculation.  Questions about the matching mechanisms were answered by 
reviewing the examples provided in the brief. Future instructions should include handouts 
where subjects may follow the examples in a worksheet format. That worksheet should 
also include surplus calculation formula, and definitions of WTA, WTP, bid and salary. 
4. Exchange Rate 
The calculated exchange rate for the experiment setup is $11,312 (experiment to 
real dollars). The actual exchange rate was rounded to $10,000 for simplicity. Targeted 
payout was $20 (excluding $5 participation fee); while the actual average payout was 
$19.50. While the exchange rate worked well for the trial, higher experimental surpluses 
can be expected once the program errors have been fixed and all program variables are 




9 As noted by Tan (2006), the salary increment should be set to less than 10% of the WTA/WTP 
increment. During the trial, the WTA and WTP increments were set to $1,000, and the salary step was set 
to $100.  
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Simulation of both proposed matching mechanisms demonstrate their efficiency 
and effectiveness at matching sailors to assignments under the AIP program. However, it 
was shown that the sailor-optimal mechanism resulted in significantly more economic 
surplus accruing to sailors than by the billet-optimal mechanism. However, the efficiency 
of the matching mechanisms depends on sailor using a bidding strategy that truthfully 
represents their WTAs. The experiment is designed to measure the impact of various 
parameters on bidding strategies.  
The program allows matching method, level of WTP information provided to 
subjects, and level of competition for jobs to be changed. Additionally, communication 
may or may not be restricted during experiment sessions. A trial run of the experiment 
showed the program made matches efficiently and effectively as simulation of the 
proposed matching mechanisms.  Minor problems were identified during the trial that 
will need to be corrected prior to conducting further experiments. 
The trial run of the program suggests that bidding will not match WTA, affecting 
the efficiency of the models. Further testing should be conducted to analyze the factors 
affecting bidding strategy, and the effect of bidding strategies themselves on efficiency of 





















V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research focused on matching mechanisms proposed by Homb (2006) and 
Tan (2006) that may be applicable to the Navy’s AIP program. Efficient market theory 
stipulates that efficient distribution of resources requires accurate and open valuations of 
worth by both buyer and supplier. Commodity or active markets establish efficient prices 
through multiple transactions. Auctions are an effective means to establish efficient 
prices where limited transaction opportunities exist. Multiple items may be auctioned 
sequentially or concurrently. Matching mechanisms are required when multiple items are 
auctioned at the same time and both buyer and sellers have preferences over the 
characteristics of the other party. 
The Navy’s AIP program is an implementation of auction and matching theory. 
Sailors bid a minimum WTA AIP value. The Navy matches sailors to AIP billets by 
considering the sailor’s bids and the sailor’s attractiveness to the billet (e.g., 
qualifications, transfer and training expenses). Overall effectiveness of the matching 
process depends on truthful bidding by sailors and valuing of those sailors by the Navy, 
however both theoretical and experimental evidence suggests that sailors are probably 
significantly inflating their bids under the current AIP system. Proposed alternative 
matching mechanisms may provide different truth revealing incentives, and provide more 
of the economic surplus gained from the matches to either the sailor or the Navy. The 
sailor-optimal model is expected to be more truth revealing for sailors than the billet-
optimal model, however the sailor-optimal model is also expected to pay more AIP than 
the billet-optimal model. Tan (2006) proposed that the more truth revealing nature of the 
sailor-optimal model would make it more cost effective than the billet-optimal model.  
The experiment program was developed to test how understanding the two 
matching models would affect a subject’s propensity to truthfully reveal their WTA. 
Experiment subjects competed for generic jobs, emulating negotiating for future 
assignments. The experiment subjects were given their WTA for each job and limited 
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knowledge of a job’s WTP for them, emulating a sailor’s preference for those future 
assignments and what that sailor knows of the other sailors available for that assignment. 
WTAs and WTPs for jobs ranged from a minimum to maximum total salary. Sailors were 
modeled as considering total salary since they knew their base pay, and were bidding to 
add a range of AIPs from zero to a given maximum AIP amount. The generic nature of 
the experiment should allow extrapolation of experimental results with subjects that are 
not drawn from the same population as the sailors participating in the AIP program. 
The experiment program was tested by simulating a group of ten participants 
bidding their WTA. Thirty rounds of bidding were completed for both matching models 
(for a total of 60 rounds of bidding). Effectiveness and efficiency data were calculated 
and compared to the simulation of the matching models to demonstrate the program’s 
ability to make matches using both models. A trial was conducted with volunteers to test 
the actual online operation of the program, verify usability of the user interface, and 
verify the adequacy of the experiment instructions. One minor problem with the program 
was identified that should be corrected prior to further testing. 
Preliminary observations from the trial support the proposal that the sailor-
optimal model is more truth revealing than the billet-optimal model. Although there were 
other factors that decreased the matching rate during the trial, it appears that high bidding 
also was a factor decreasing the matching rate. It also appeared that surpluses earned by 
the subjects under the billet-optimal model were correlated with the average difference 
between WTA and bid amount. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The trial run validates the need to conduct further experiments with this program. 
Initial observations from the trial run of the experiment suggest that experimental 
subjects may not bid their WTA values in an attempt to increase their surplus, especially 
under the billet-optimal model. The only experiment parameter changed during the trial 
run was the matching model used. The experimental subjects tended to bid higher relative 
to their WTA value under the billet-optimal model than under the sailor-optimal model.  
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As expected, the matching rate was lower when subjects did not bid their WTA than 
when simulations set bids to WTA, indicating the method’s efficiency will probably be 
lower when employed in real world situations.  
The experiment design provided similar bidding incentives to experimental 
subjects as participants in the Navy’s AIP program. The experiment assumed that 
individuals can accurately determine a WTA value. The experiment did not address how 
individuals determine their WTAs values. The experiment also assumed that the Navy 
can accurately determine WTP values, and that these values are directly used. Finally, the 
trial run demonstrated that matches are more likely to be made when bids are lower 
relative to WTAs. Therefore, matches are more likely at the lower portion of the WTP 
range. It can be inferred that match rates will be lower if the lower and upper values for 
WTA are higher than the lower and upper values for WTP. Since the Navy is using AIP 
to make assignments to billets that are, in general, less desirable, the lower and upper 
values for WTAs should be higher than those values for WTP, impacting the efficiency 
of the matching mechanisms. 
The experimental program was found to accurately implement the two proposed 
matching mechanisms. Similar to previous simulations, the experimental program 
successfully matched over 95% of participants to jobs when bids are equal to WTA. 
Observed differences between the trial with volunteers and simulations suggest that 
further testing with live experimental subjects will yield significantly different results 
than simulations. The setup of the experimental program should provide experiment 
subjects similar incentives to adjust their bidding strategy as sailors participating in the 
AIP program. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A full range of experiments should be conducted to determine the effect factors 
such as matching mechanism, fidelity of WTP information, level of competition for jobs, 
and communication during the experiment may have upon the truthfulness of bidding. 
The costs of the various factors potentially affecting bidding strategy may then be 
compared to the expected gains from more truthful bidding. Additional experimentation 
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may also be conducted where the lower and upper values for WTA that are different than 
those for WTP to better emulate the lower desirability of the jobs. 
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APPENDIX A.  INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
Slide 1 
Good morning/afternoon. I am ________________ with 
_______________. You are participating in a labor market experiment. The 
experiment is internet based. Please log on to your NPS account now. 
Slide 2 
Since this is an economic experiment, we must ensure that each group 
participating get the same instructions. I will be reading from a script. Please hold 
your questions until the end of the brief. As you can see, we have a lengthy set of 
instructions to go through. After administrative remarks about your participation, 
and an overview I will give you detailed descriptions of the data that you will use 
in your decisions, and how the program will use your decisions. Finally I’ll 
describe the computer interface. 
Slide 3 
As a reminder, your participation in this experiment is voluntary. Your 
participation has no impact on any of your course grades, nor will it affect your 
fitness reports or evaluations.  
You may choose to leave at any time. Should you choose to leave prior to 
the completion of today’s experiment you will still have earned $5 for 
participating. You can expect to earn, on average, $25 for participating in all 20 
bidding sessions today. 
Slide 4 
You are participating in a labor market experiment in which prospective 
managers are matched with prospective employers. The amount you earn during 
this experiment will depend on the decisions that you make as well as the 
decisions of the other participants. You will each be paid the total amount of your 
earnings in cash at the end of the experiment.  The average earnings in this 
experiment is expected to be $25, but may vary from as low as $15 to as high as 
$35. The entire experiment will be conducted on the internet. You will be entering 
numeric values to indicate your decisions. Please do not talk or otherwise 
communicate with each other during the experiment. If you have not done so 
already, please log onto your NPS account. I will give you the website we will use 
at the end of this instruction period. 
Slide 5 
In this experiment, you will be simulating the role of a manager seeking 
employment. The 20 participants in this room have been divided into two groups 
of 10 managers.  The 10 managers in each group are considering employment at 
ten companies, each of which has a single job opening for which all 10 managers  
are qualified. There will be twenty sessions where you will bid for these jobs. 





In each session, managers , you, may be matched to at most one 
company. Each company can hire at most one manager. Matches will be made 
partially based on your inputs during the bidding sessions and the inputs of the 
other participants. 
Slide 7 
For each of the 10 job openings, there is a minimum salary you are willing 
to accept, based on factors such as location preference, perceived cost of living, 
and anticipated job satisfaction. Your minimum acceptable salary for a job 
opening will be referred to as your “willingness-to-accept”, or WTA, for that job. 
WTAs are given to you. Each manager has different preferences and 
perceptions, and therefore the managers in your group of 10 will have different 
values for their willingness-to-accept for any particular job. These values are all 
randomly generated. Each manager has a WTA for each job, making 10 WTAs 
for each manager. For all 10 managers that means 100 different random values 
per bidding session. 
Slide 8 
Each manager also has different education and experience that makes 
them more or less valuable to the 10 potential employers. Each employer will 
also pay the relocation expenses for whichever manager (if any) that is hired.  
These factors combine to make a maximum salary each employer is willing to 
pay any particular manager. The maximum salary an employer is willing to pay a 
particular manager will be referred to as that employer’s “willingness-to-pay”, or 
WTP, for that manager. Each employer has different preferences and needs, and 
therefore the 10 potential employers will have different values for their 
willingness-to-pay for any particular manager. 
Slide 9 
You, of course, will not have complete information on how much the 
company is willing to pay you. However, you will have some idea of how well 
your qualifications and transfer expenses compare to the other managers in your 
group for each company. Your WTP ranking tells you your standing among the 
other managers for that job. For each job, managers are ordered according to 
their WTP values. The highest three values are in the Top, lowest 4 values in the 
bottom, and the others in the middle. 
Slide 10 
As a recap, WTA is the minimum salary you would be willing to accept to 
work for a company. If you were paid less than that, you project you would be 
loosing money working for that company, or feel that you’re not paid enough for 
the job. At or above that amount you expect you would be making enough to 
cover your living expenses, and may be paid more than you need to be to do that 
job. You would be said to be receiving an economic surplus, which is what your 
earnings at the end of the experiment will be based on. 
WTP on the other hand is the economic benefit the company expects you 
to generate if they hire you. The company will not hire you if the salary they 
would have to pay you is higher than WTP. 
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Both WTA and WTP are generated randomly by the computer each 
session. WTA and WTP are independent of each other, but are drawn from the 
same range of possible salaries, from 40 to 80 thousand. Each randomly 
generated WTA and WTP will be in that range, but there is no guarantee that 
WTA will be above WTP for every manager and job combination.  
Each manager, that is each of you participating in this experiment, will 
have 10 random WTAs and 10 random WTPs, one each for each company. Each 
of you will have these WTAs and WTPs generated randomly. Most likely you will 
all have different values assigned. 
Slide 11 
The experiment will be broken into 20 bidding sessions,  At the start of 
each session, you will be shown your willingness to accept for each of the 10 job 
openings, and given a ranking for each employer’s willingness to pay amounts 
for you.  
 You indicate the minimum salary you would be willing to accept to 
your potential employers. You may bid to work for as many of the companies as 
you wish in each period. You will be selected by no more than one company per 
session.  
Slide 12 
Each company may receive bids from more than one manager, but may 
only offer the job to one manager per round. Matching will be made by the 
computer using one of two methods described later in each period of bidding. In 
no case will any candidate be matched to a job at less then their bid, nor will a 
job be matched to a candidate above its willingness to pay. 
Slide 13 
One of two methods will be used. In both methods the computer will 
choose a random order to sort through managers and jobs each round. Jobs will 
only be matched to participants which have bid on them. Each method generates 
offers based on bids and WTP. The program attempts to match the greatest 
differences between WTP and bids. Where multiple managers have the same 
differences between WTP and bid, the program finds the best match by changing 
the salary to be offered until only one manager has the largest difference. 
Slide 14 
In the first matching method we will use today, salaries are set to WTP for 
each manager/job combination. Any job that has a salary set lower than the 
manager’s bid amount will not be considered further. The program cycles through 
all the managers in a random order to make matches. 
Slide 15 
The first manager considered will be matched to the job giving him or her 
the highest non-negative difference between salary and bid. Once a match is 
made, the potential salaries for all other managers for the job matched to 
manager 1 are decreased by 1000, indicating competition for that job. The next 
manager is matched in the same way. If the job matched had already been 
matched to another manager, that previously matched manager is bumped from 
the match. Again, salaries for other managers on this job are decreased. 
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Slide 16 
The process continues until all 10 managers are matched without 
bumping, or no further matches can be made because all the remaining salaries 
are below bid amount. 
Again, at most, one manager will be matched per job. 
Slide 17 
It is a confusing procedure. Here is an example, using only 3 managers 
and jobs. WTAs and WTPs are 1 to 7 in this example. 
Slide 18 
These are randomly generated WTAs for 3 managers and 3 jobs. You will 
be shown your WTA for each job. You will not be shown anyone else’s values. 
You will also be shown your WTP ranking 
Slide 19 
Here you can see how ranking relates to actual WTP values. Notice that 
they are evaluated by Job. For example, Job 1 has values 5, 4, and 6 for 
managers 1, 2, and 3. They are assigned middle, bottom and top rankings 
respectively. 
Slide 20 
Given WTA and WTP ranking, managers make their bids, seen here in 
green. 
Slide 21 
Method one starts out by setting potential salaries equal to WTPs. 
Slide 22 
The sort order for managers and jobs will be different each session. We’ll 
sort through manager in order in this example. So, for the first manager, the 
potential salaries and bids are compared. In this case the largest difference is for 
Job one. Manager 1 is then matched to job 1, at an offer of 5. Potential salaries 
of job 1 to managers 2 and 3 are reduced. Job 3 was an impossible match since 
the potential salary is less than the bid. 
Slide 23 
The next manager is compared. Not that the potential salary for manager 
2 for job 1 has been decreased since the initial values. In this case it didn’t 
matter, as manager 2 is matched to job 2 regardless.  
Slide 24 
Next, manager 3 is compared. Note that the Potential salaries for job 1 
and 2 have been decreased. Job 2 is an impossible match because the potential 
salary is less than the bid amount. Job 1 and 3  differences are the same, so the 
first job in the random sorting will be matched to manager 3. This job had 
previously been matched to manager 1, so manager 1 is bumped from this job 
and will be matched again. Potential salaries for job 1 to managers 2 and 3 are 
decreased. 
Slide 25 
Since manager 1 was bumped, comparison need to be done again. Again, 
job 1 is the best match, bumping manager 3. Again, salaries on Job 1 for 
managers 2 & 3 are decreased. 
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Slide 26 
Manager 2 is skipped since he was not bumped from previous match 
Slide 27 
Manager 3 is compared again. This time the best match, job 3, which does 
not bump either of the other 2 managers. At this point matching is complete and 
you will be able to review the results of that session. 
Slide 28 
Remember, your take home winnings are based on the choices you and 
the other participants make. Each $10,000 surplus in the game equates to $1 
take home pay. Surplus is calculated by your WTA from the matched salary. On 
average we expect the participants to average $10,000 surplus each period. 
Slide 29 
In the initial bidding rounds you will have 5 minutes to complete your bids 
to allow you time to get familiar with the bidding interface. Later periods will move 
faster as familiarity increases. You will know when bidding will close. 
You may bid on all, some or none of the companies each period. 
We should complete 20 sessions. 
Slide 30 
The computer interface. 
Slide 31 
In a few moments I’ll ask you to start internet explorer and go to the 
website. You have your logon information at your computer. Once you’ve logged 
on, this is the screen you’ll see.  
<click> 
When we are all ready, I’ll open the bidding session. At that time click on 
Bid Jobs 
Slide 32 
This is the screen where you will enter your bids.  
Slide 33 
Use the mouse or tab key to navigate among the entry boxes. Be careful 
making entries.  
Slide 34 
Once you’ve bid on all the jobs you wish to bid on, press the submit bids 
button. Remember, you may bid on all 10 companies, some of the companies, or 
none of the companies. You have no chance to be matched to jobs to which 
you’ve made no bid. 
Slide 35 
After you’ve submitted your bids you will come to this screen.  
Slide 36 
You may change any of your bids. 
Slide 37 
Simply enter the new value and 
<click> 
Press change bids button 
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Slide 38 
Deleting a bid is a bit more complicated. You do not just want to just 
change the value to zero, as that will be recognized as a bid. Rather press the 
clear button next to the bid you want to remove and 
<click> 
Press OK on the warning pop-up box. 
Slide 39 
Notice that the bid will be clear.  
<click> 
Press the change bids button. 
Slide 40 
Properly cleared bids will no longer have a clear button next to them. 
I will tell you when the bidding session is over. I will ask you if you are 
finished making bids prior to ending bidding sessions in less than 5 minutes. 
<click> 
Once the bidding session is over, I’ll ask you to click Bid Jobs. 
Slide 41 
You’ll come back to the blank screen again. From here you may click 
Latest bid info to see your last match and current earnings. 
Slide 42 
This is also the screen that we’ll ask you to print at the end of today's 
experiment so we can pay you. 
Slide 43 
Summarizing WTA, WTP, bids and offers. You are given WTA and a WTP 
ranking.  
You input your bids. 
The computer considers only Bid and WTP when making matches. 
The program generates salaries for matches made. 
Your earnings are salaries matched less the WTA amount. 
Slide 44 
Final points 
-At most, one to one matching 
-Managers could end up without a match (resulting in no change to 
running surplus) 
The matched salary will not be less than your bid for that job, and not 




First 10 rounds. Please open internet explorer and navigate to 
www.forum977.com/auction. 
Slide 47 
Now that we have completed the first 10 rounds I will describe the matching 
method for the next 10 rounds. 
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Slide 48 
We will now start using the second matching mechanism. Most of the 
method is the same: still being done by the program when we close bidding, still 
based on your inputs and WTP, and the salary won’t be less than bid nor greater 
than WTP 
Slide 49 
Still limits consideration to managers making bids, and still attempts to 
maximize WTP/bid difference. 
What is different is how potential salary is set, and that the sorting is done 
by job rather than manager. 
Slide 50 
In this method, potential salaries are set to the bids (where previously they 
had been set to WTP).  
Slide 51 
In this method, the computer cycles through jobs rather than managers to 
make matches. Matches are made for the largest WTP / potential salary 
difference. The first company will be matched to the manager with the largest 
WTP / potential salary difference. Potential salaries for that manager for all other 
jobs are increased, indicating competition for that manager. Then the next job is 
considered, and matched similarly. As before, new matches always bump old 
matches. The same process continues on through all the jobs. 
Slide 52 
As before, the cycle continue until all 10 jobs are matched, or no further 
matching can be made because potential salaries are above bid amount.  
Slide 53 
Again, I will demonstrate using a simple matching example with 3 managers and 
3 jobs. 
Slide 54 
Here’s a similar example as we did for the previous method. This is the 
information you would have. 
Slide 55 
Here are the underlying values for WTPs 
Slide 56 
And again, bids are in green. 
Slide 57 
In this method, Potential salaries are set to bid amount. This is different 
than the last method where salaries were set to WTP. 
Slide 58 
Jobs and managers are sorted randomly. Method 2 evaluates jobs one at 
a time. The first job in this case would be matched to Manager 3. All other 
potential salaries to manager 3 would be increased. 
Slide 59 
The second job would be matched to manager 2. Note that the potential 
salary for manager 3 had been increased, and that that match was impossible 
since the offer was larger than WTP.  
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Slide 60 
Job 3 has only one possible match. Matching job 3 to manager 3 bumps 
job 1 match to manager 3. 
Slide 61 
Back to job 1, two managers have the same high difference. The tie goes 
to the first manager, which will be randomly determined. This match does not 
bump any of the other matches, so the cycle is complete. 
Slide 62 
You can see that in both cases the same jobs are matched to the same 
managers. This is not always the case. Salaries for method 2 tend to be lower. 
The first method we used started the salaries at the max willingness to 
pay and decreased them due to competition. The method for the remainder of 









• Participation and overview
• WTA, WTP, and bidding
• Manager/job matching procedure
• Matching example
• Surplus and earnings




• Your participation in this experiment is 
strictly voluntary
• Course grades, FITREPs, and evals are 
unaffected by your participation
• You may leave at any time
– If you leave before completion of today’s 
experiment you will be paid $5
– Those who stay until the end of the 
experiment should earn an average of $25
4
Overview
• Labor market experiment
– Prospective managers (you) matched with
– Prospective employers (computer)
• You are seeking employment
• Amount you earn today will be based on 
decisions you and other participants make
– Average earnings = $25
• $10,000 game money = $1 real money
5
Participant Breakout
• 20 participants, broken into 2 groups of 10
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6
Matching Managers to Employers
• Each manager matched to one company (or none)
• Each company matched to one manager (or none)































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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7Willingness to Accept (WTA)
• Minimum salary a manager is willing to accept for a 
particular job 
• Based on many factors, such as:
– Location preference
– Perceived cost of living
– Anticipated job satisfaction
• Combined factors yields Willingness to Accept
• WTA values will be randomly generated for each 
manager for each job 
– 10 managers × 10 companies = 100 WTA values
• WTA values range from $40,000 to $80,000
– Each value in range equally likely
– Rounded to nearest $1000
8
Willingness to Pay (WTP)
• Maximum a company is willing to pay for a particular 
manager (you)
• Each manager
– Meets requirements for all 10 companies
– Has different experience and education
– Will have different relocation expenses
• Companies have different preferences
• Combined factors yield Willingness to Pay
• WTP values randomly generated for each job for each 
manager
– 10 managers × 10 companies = 100 WTP values
• WTP values range from $40,000 to $80,000
– Each value in range equally likely
– Rounded to nearest $1000
9
Job WTP Standing
• You will not be told a company’s WTP for your 
services
• You will, however, have some idea where you 
stand relative to other managers for each job
• For each job, you will be told your “Job WTP 
Standing”
– “Top” = Among top 3 managers in terms of WTP
– “Middle” = Among middle 3 managers in terms of WTP
– “Bottom” = Among bottom 4 managers in terms of WTP
10
WTA vs. WTP
• WTA: Minimum salary a manager (you) is willing 
to accept for a particular job
• WTP: Maximum salary a company (computer) is 
willing to pay for a particular manager
• WTA and WTP generated independently
– No correlation between WTA and WTP
– If a manager has a high (low) WTA for a job, does not 
mean job has a high (low) WTP for that manager
• Each manager has different WTAs for each job
• Each job has different WTPs for each manager
11
Bidding
• You will participate in 20 bidding sessions
• Each session you will be given:
– WTA for each job
– WTP standing for each job
• You make salary bids to companies
• You may bid on all, some, or none




• Done by computer at bidding close
• Matching based on bids from managers 
and WTPs from companies
– Each manager matched to one company (or none)
– Each company matched to one manager (or none)
• Salary for each manager/company match 
will fall somewhere between bid and WTP
– Manager will be paid at least his bid salary




• Only managers bidding for a particular job are 
eligible to be matched to that job
• The matching procedure generates matches 
based on difference between WTP and bid for all 
manager/company combinations
– The greater the difference (WTP - bid), the more likely 
a particular manager/company match is to occur
• The matching procedure systematically 
generates salaries based on:
– WTP and bid values
– Level of competition among employees for each job 14
Matching Procedure
• Potential salary for each manager/job 
combination is initially set equal to 
company’s WTP for that manager
– Remember: 10 managers × 10 companies = 
100 potential salary values
• Managers are randomly assigned a job 
selection order from #1 to #10
15
Matching Procedure
• Manager #1 is tentatively matched to job that provides 
biggest potential salary - bid split
– Potential salary each other manager could receive from Manager 
#1’s chosen job is decreased by $1,000
– Manager #1’s potential salary for that job remains unchanged
• Manager #2 matched the same way
– Potential salary each other manager could receive from Manager 
#2’s chosen job is decreased by $1,000
– Manager #2’s potential salary for that job remains unchanged
– Any previous match to the same job is dropped
• Process is repeated for Managers #3 through #10
• Unless all 10 managers are matched to a job at the end 
of the cycle, repeat the process starting with Manager #1
– Potential salaries (possibly reduced) carry-over to next cycle
16
Matching Procedure
• Cycle through manager job selection continues 
until each manager is matched to a job that 
provides him/her the largest salary - bid split
– Given current potential salaries, which likely have 
been reduced incrementally throughout process
– Could mean that manager remains unmatched, 
because all current potential salaries are at or below 
his/her bids for those jobs
• Each manager will be matched to at most one 
company they bid on
• Each company will be matched to at most one 
manager who submitted a bid
Matching Example
(3 managers & 3 jobs)
18
Manager Information
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M
anager
The matching procedure 
uses only WTPs and bids
Salaries initially set 
equal to WTPs
Method 1 22
Manager 1 - Cycle 1
• Tentatively matched 
to job 1
• Potential salaries for 
other managers at 
job 1 decreased by 1
Job Salary Bid Salary - Bid
1 5 3 2
2 3 2 1
3 5 7 -
Method 1 23
Manager 2 - Cycle 1
• Tentatively matched 
to job 2
• Potential salaries for 
other managers at 
job 2 decreased by 1
Job Salary Bid Salary - Bid
1 3   (orig. 4) 2 1
2 5 2 3
3 2 2 0
Method 1 24
Manager 3 - Cycle 1
• Two jobs have 
highest salary - bid 
split
• Match to first: Job 1
• Bump manager 1 
from job 1
• Potential salaries for 
other managers at 
job 1 decreased by 1
Job Salary Bid Salary - Bid
1 5   (orig. 6) 3 2
2 3   (orig. 4) 5 -
3 7 5 2
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Method 1 25
Manager 1 - Cycle 2
• Not all managers 
matched to jobs at end 
of cycle, so repeat
• Again, tentatively 
matched to job 1
• Bump manager 3 from 
job 1
• Potential salaries for 
other managers at job 1 
decreased by 1
Job Salary Bid Salary - Bid
1 4   (orig. 5) 3 1
2 2   (orig. 3) 2 0
3 5 7 -
Method 1 26
Manager 2 - Cycle 2
• Remains matched to 
job 2
• If a manager is not 
bumped from 
previous match, no 
choice to make in 
following cycle
• No change to 
potential salaries
Job Salary Bid Salary - Bid
1 1   (orig. 4) 2 2
2 5 2 3
3 5 2 -
Method 1 27
Manager 3 - Cycle 2
• Now matched to job 3
• Potential salaries for 
other managers at job 3 
decreased by 1
• Cycle ends with each 
manager matched to a 
job
• Matching process 
complete
Job Salary Bid Salary - Bid
1 4   (orig. 6) 3 1
2 3   (orig. 4) 5 -
3 7 5 2
28
Your Surplus and Earnings
• Experimental earnings based on total surplus 
from all periods
– Surplus = Salary - WTA
• Experimental earnings will be converted to 
actual earnings using exchange rate
– $10,000 game = $1 take home
• Average earnings expected to be about $25
– $5 flat payment for participation
– Average of about $20 depending on decisions made
29
Bidding Periods
• Expect to participate in 20 periods
• Bidding periods initially 5 minutes
– Reduced time as familiarity improves
– You will know time bidding closes
• Place as many bids as you like each 
period





Screen when no bidding session active
Click here when bidding session starts
32
Screen to enter Minimum Salary Requests
33
Use mouse or tab key to navigate between
Minimum Salary Request boxes
34
Press Submit Bids to send your 
Minimum Salary Requests to program
35





Change request in entry box
Ensure you press Change Bids button
38
Press clear button to delete a bid entirely
Press OK on warning dialog
39
Note that box is cleared
Again, press Change Bids
40
Blank box and missing clear button 
indicate no request made for that job
(program will not match you to that job)
After bidding stop  click Bid Jobs
41
Click Latest Bid Info to see last matches
42
Top line shows matched job
Lower section shows all inputs
63
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• Matched to one at the most
– Each managers to at most one job
– Each job to at most one manager
– Could be matched to none (unmatched)
• Matching based on WTP & bids (not WTA)
– Salary will always be at or below WTP
– Salary will always be at or above bid
• Earnings each round = Salary - WTA
Questions?
46
Rounds 1 - 10
• Open Internet Explorer
• Navigate to 
• Your username and password is the 
number at your terminal
www.forum977.com/auction
Additional Instructions 
After First 10 Rounds
48
New Matching Procedure
• SAME: Done by computer at bidding close
• SAME: Matching based on bids from managers 
and WTPs from companies
– Each manager matched to one company (or none)
– Each company matched to one manager (or none)
• SAME: Salary for each manager/company 
match will fall somewhere between bid and WTP
– Manager will be paid at least his bid salary




• SAME: Only managers bidding for a particular 
job are eligible to be matched to that job
• SAME: The matching procedure generates 
matches based on difference between WTP and 
bid for all manager/company combinations
– The greater the difference (WTP - bid), the more likely 
a particular manager/company match is to occur
• NEW: The matching procedure systematically 
generates salaries based on:
– WTP and bid values
– Level of competition among jobs for each employee 50
New Matching Procedure
• NEW: Potential salary for each 
manager/job combination is initially set 
equal to manager’s bid for that job
– Remember: 10 managers × 10 companies = 
100 potential salary values
• NEW: Companies are randomly assigned 
a manager selection order from #1 to #10
51
New Matching Procedure
• Company #1 is tentatively matched to manager that 
provides biggest potential WTP - salary split
– Potential salary each other company must pay company #1’s 
chosen manager is increased by $1,000
– Company #1’s salary for that manager remains unchanged
• Company #2 matched the same way
– Potential salary each other company must pay company #2’s 
chosen manager is increased by $1,000
– Company #2’s salary for that manager remains unchanged
– Any previous match to the same job is dropped
• Process is repeated for companies #3 through #10
• Unless all 10 companies are matched to a manager at 
the end of the cycle, repeat the process starting with 
company #1
– Potential salaries (possibly increased) carry-over to next cycle
52
New Matching Procedure
• Cycle through company manager selection continues 
until each company is matched to a manager that 
provides it the largest WTP - salary split
– Given current potential salaries, which likely have been 
increased incrementally throughout process
– Could mean that company remains unmatched, because all 
current potential salaries are at or above its WTPs for those 
managers
• Each manager will be matched to at most one company 
they bid on
• Each company will be matched to at most one manager 
who submitted a bid
Matching Example
(3 managers & 3 jobs)
54
Manager Information
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anager
Same WTA & WTP values 








































Same WTA & WTP values 
used in original example
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Manager Bids
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M
anager
New matching procedure also
uses only WTPs and bids
Salaries initially set 
equal to bids
Method 2 58
Job 1 - Cycle 1 
• Best WTP - Salary 
split provided by 
manager 3
• Tentatively matched 
to manager 3
• Salaries other jobs 
must pay manager 3 
increased by 1
Mgr WTP Salary WTP -Salary
1 5 3 2
2 4 2 2
3 6 3 3
Method 2 59
Job 2 - Cycle 1 
• Tentatively matched 
to manager 2
• Salaries other jobs 
must pay manager 2 
increased by 1
Mgr WTP Salary WTP -Salary
1 3 2 1
2 5 2 3
3 4 6   (orig. 5) -
Method 2 60
Job 3 - Cycle 1 
• Tentatively matched 
to manager 3
• Bump job 1 from 
manager 3 match
• Salaries other jobs 
must pay manager 3 
increased by 1
Mgr WTP Salary WTP -Salary
1 5 7 -
2 2 3   (orig. 2) -
3 7 6   (orig. 5) 1
66
Method 2 61
Job 1 - Cycle 2 
• Two managers provide 
highest WTP - salary 
split
• Match to first: Manager 1
• Salaries other jobs must 
pay manager 1 increase 
by 1
• Jobs 2 and 3 remain with 
previous matches
• Matching process 
complete
Mgr WTP Salary WTP -Salary
1 5 3 2
2 4 3   (orig. 2) 1
3 6 4   (orig. 3) 2
62
Matching Procedure Comparison
Procedure 1 Procedure 2
Job Salary Job Salary
1 1 4 1 3
2 2 5 2 2
3 3 7 3 6
Manager
• Two procedures will often (but not always) generate same 
manager/job matches (given same WTPs & bids)
– Method 1: Matches based on salary - bid splits, but salary initially 
= WTP, so initial matches based on WTP - bid splits
– Method 2: Matches based on WTP - salary splits, but salary 




• If your session times out use the same 
logon (previous data are saved)
67
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APPENDIX B.  WEBSITE USER GUIDE 
A. WEBSITE INTRODUCTION 
The experiment uses code hosted at http://www.forum977.com/auction/. The 
interface is dynamically generated webpages using PHP scripting language and the 
mySQL database engine. It was developed to work with all web browsers, but has only 
been tested with Microsoft Internet Explorer 7.0. The site is password protected. 
Accounts have either administrative or general user access. 
General users may bid for jobs when bidding sessions are started by administrator 
users. Users bid are grouped, and are given information pertaining to their group, and 
compete only with their group for jobs. When the bidding session is closed, users who 
submitted bids are matched to jobs, and given salaries and surpluses. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL 
Administrative users can add, delete, or modify user accounts, available jobs, 
WTA and WTP ranges, start and stop bidding sessions, and view previous sessions (see 
Figure 4.  ). 
Figure 4.   Administrative Menu 
 
 
1. User Control 
All users must have an account established through the “Add User” Admin Menu 
link. Users must be given a first and last name. This first and last name will be displayed 
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on all user bid submission and history pages. Users must also be given a unique 
username, which is used for logging onto the website. Finally, a password must be 
provided for each user. By default, users are given general access, but may be given 
administrator access. Administrator accounts can not make bids. The title option is no 
longer used and may be ignored. 
New users are assigned to group 1 by default. User groups may be changed by 
following the “Change User/Group” Admin Menu link. The program currently can have a 
maximum of 10 users in groups participating in bidding sessions. User names, passwords, 
and access level may be changed by following the “All Users” Main Menu link. Users 
may also be deleted by following this link. 
2. Jobs Control 
Additional jobs may be added through the “Add Job” Admin Menu link. Jobs may 
only be given a name (e.g., Job 1). Job names may be edited by following the “All Jobs” 
Main Menu link. That link also shows whether jobs will be made available for bidding 
(only jobs with a check mark in the Select/Unselect box are available for bidding). To 
make a job available for bidding (or remove it from bidding) click the check box, and 
press the “Select/Unselect” button at the bottom of the page. The maximum number of 
jobs that may be selected is currently 10. Finally, jobs may be deleted entirely at this link. 
3. WTA and WTP Control 
Ranges for WTA and WTP are set at the “Add WTA/WTP” Admin Link. Upper 
and lower bounds for WTA and WTP can be set independently, and are inclusive. The 
ranges WTA and WTP (i.e., Upper Range – Lower Range) must be divisible by the steps 
entered for that range. The size of the salary step may also be changed on this page. Prior 
to starting every bidding session the Update WTA/WTP button must be pressed. 
4. Bidding Session Control 
Bidding sessions are controlled via the “Manage Bids” Admin Menu link. 
Maximum duration for bidding sessions may be changed on this page. To start a bidding 
session first select matching model (Seeker Optimal or Job Optimal) and press the “Start 
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bidding session” button. General users may make bids on available jobs until time expires 
or the administrator presses the “Stop bidding session” button. The administrator is able 
to see bids that users make during the bidding session. 
5. Viewing History 
The WTAs, WTPs, user bids, salaries and matches made (all user/job 
combinations, not just matched combinations) are saved for each bidding session at the 
“All Rounds” Main Menu link. The match and salary information from the most recently 
completed bidding session can be viewed at the “Recent Match” Admin Menu link. All 
matches and salary information (matched combinations only) can be viewed at the “All 
Matches” Admin Menu link. 
C. GENERAL USER INTERFACE 
General users may only bid for jobs (during bidding sessions) view previous 
match results and see their current surplus. Once an administrator has started a bidding 
session general users access the bidding page through the “Bid Jobs” User Menu link.  
Bidders will be presented their WTA and WTP ranking for each job available for 
bidding. They will be presented their information only. Bidders may make bids on any or 
all of the jobs available, navigating between the entry fields by mouse or tab button. 
When satisfied with their bids, the bidder presses the “Submit Bids” button. The user will 
then be able to change or delete any of those bids until the bidding session is stopped. 
Users must press the “Change Bids” button to change their registered bids. Users must 
use the “Clear” and “Change Bids” buttons to withdraw a bid completely. 
At the completion of a bidding session, users should press the “Bid Jobs” User 
Menu link, and click “Latest Bid info” to see their matched job and salary. This page also 
shows the running surplus that the user has earned through all the bidding sessions.  
D. GENERIC EXPERIMENT FLOW 
 The following table is a general outline for conducting an experiment with the 
described program. 
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Prior to experiment 
Recruit volunteers 
Prepare any surveys 
Obtain payment money 
Ensure access to sufficient computers with access to the internet 
Create sufficient new user accounts 
Assign users to groups 
Set initial WTA/WTP and step sizes 
Ensure sufficient jobs are created and selected 
Ensure bidding session time correct 
During experiment 
Assign participants to account 
Change number of jobs selected if required 
Change user groups if required 
Give instructions 
Direct users to logon to website 
For each session 
Admin Click “Add WTA/WTP” 
Change if required 
Always press “Update WTA/WTP” 
Admin Click “Manage bids” 
Select Matching Model 
Press “Start Bidding” 
Wait until window no longer says session has ended 
Direct participants to begin bidding 
Participants Click “Bid Jobs” 
Place bids 
Change bids as necessary 
Admin Allow bidding time to expire or press “Stop bidding” 
button 
 
Participant Click “Bid Jobs” 
Click “Latest round info” 
Completing experiment 
Participants Click latest bid info 
Print this page (your receipt to collect money) 
Turn in page and other survey sheets 
Collect money 
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